

*Source Reference*

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## PROGRESS REPORT - I&SO

(October 1950 - December 31, 1951)

The Security Program <sup>was</sup> is based upon the concept that a penetration of the CIA is a No. 1 target <sup>of</sup> all foreign intelligence agencies of subversive groups within the United States. Our aim <sup>is</sup> to the direct protection from penetration or compromise of every employee, (building facility, equipment,) document or information which could tend to disclose <sup>our</sup> intelligence and our intelligence sources and methods. In addition to positive anti-penetration defense, the program must provide continuing controls and policy guidance to our personnel to avoid inadvertent disclosures, compromise of <sup>our</sup> material outside the Agency, and leakage of bits and pieces of information which may give a definite picture of <sup>our</sup> activities to foreign intelligence analysts.

Assuming the utmost in thoroughness in investigation of applicants, the best investigative aids, perfection in guard systems, protective devices and controls, we affirm that real security is no better than the leadership in this field exercised by supervisors at every level, nor than the degree of personal security responsibility assumed by the mass of individual employees.

This Progress Report of the Inspection and Security Office will consider security operations during the period from the standpoint of major security functions required and performed rather than the administrative organization used. (A functional presentation omits the confusion of administrative compartmentation on a "need to know" basis necessitated itself by security factors.) The following are the major security operations of the I&SO:

- (1) Screening and vetting of personnel
- (2) Indoctrination of personnel
- (3) Employee controls
- (4) Physical Security controls
- (5) Policy Controls
- (6) Inspection
- (7) Counter-Intelligence Research and Action
- (8) Operational Support

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Indoctrination;

Indoctrination includes the initial Security and Agency indoctrination of the employee, the guidance to him through Security Regulations and a series of interviews such as departure interviews before going overseas, debriefings on return from overseas or special assignment, security advisory interviews upon his request on official or personal problems, and exit interviews upon his termination. The indoctrination as a whole of the employee has improved during the period by the four-day Agency Indoctrination inaugurated by the Director for Training. [This, in addition to being an efficiency and morale factor, is a definite security improvement in reducing security breaches through ignorance or naivete. On the other hand, the initial security indoctrination needs improvement.] Due to lack of suitable auditorium space and due to the great influx of employees the ability to give careful personal indoctrination by both I&SO and their own supervisors has not been as thorough as when the Agency was small. Again, security leadership and supervision at all levels has not been as good during this period due to the operational pressures.

Employee Controls:

Employee controls within the U. S. require an increasing amount of effort by this office as the Agency grows. These controls (at first seem somewhat restrictive to new members, and as mentioned above considerable indoctrination is necessary to enforce them. (Under this category come) all the personal problems ranging from the major consideration of cover down to individual problems of attendance at courses, authorship of articles for publication or arrests and court actions for minor offenses. Deep cover persons offer no great problem as they are not or should never be brought near our buildings and are handled personally by case officers. However, the mass of light official cover personnel now being recruited pose many problems. The cover situation for these people has deteriorated to some extent during the period but by the Fall of 1951 a general tightening up is correcting the situation.

Overlapping into the functions of policy, indoctrination, and employee control is the principle of anonymity which this office believes essential to security for the great bulk of our people. Mention of our people by name in the Press and articles either written by them or about them may in themselves contain no classified information but as a part of the "pattern" made up by foreign analysts might become of definite value. In some cases it renders the persons forever ineligible

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of being sent abroad on even a semi-covert basis. The growth of the Agency and the obvious interest of the press and public make difficult a common sense enforcement of the principle of anonymity. Measures are being taken to improve this procedure.

It is in employee control matters that a paternal or should we say fraternal approach by Security is imperative. There have been numbers of cases ranging from mental breakdown to personal disaster where the positive help of Security is necessary to avoid chance of security risk to the Agency. We have found during the year that this type of positive help has increased the confidence of the employees in I&SO and causes them to come to us voluntarily with their problems.

Physical Security Controls;

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During the period, the number of CIA buildings increased from [REDACTED]. This large number of buildings, many of them widely separated, creates a definite security hazard which has been reported many times. The cost of the guards alone amounts to approximately \$706,000 annually. The additional transportation and courier systems necessary to maintain such a widespread installation is not only costly but creates many risks in transit of documents and in collection of classified waste, etc.

Notwithstanding the space difficulty, the physical security controls have kept up with the increase in the Agency. The GSA guards on duty with CIA are paid at grades higher than other GSA guards and they have all been security investigated. While these guards are not of the highest type, the physical security system is based upon the combination of the guard at the door, the badge system, the regulations imposed upon employees in not leaving classified information exposed, and at night on the combination of restricted entrances, guards, locked safes, and nightly inspections of premises not only by the guards but by our own night security officers. Proportionally, security violations such as open safes and exposed classified material have definitely decreased during the period.

Improved technical aids to physical security such as microphone detectors, etc. have been more widely used. Great improvements have been made of methods of destruction of classified waste.

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Policy Controls:

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Security policy is of course a part of each of the other functions. However, we have found our overall policy problems greatly magnified. Major policies which have been handled include dissemination of intelligence to our own government departments and the interchange of specific intelligence with foreign governments. It is believed that we are on a sound basis to date in this respect although the decision as to what and to whom to give our information will always be a delicate one. These policy problems have required closer security liaison with the major defense agencies of the government. During the period this office also engaged in actual security

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Inspection:

Inspection is an integral part of a security system to provide overall examination of each function and to provide the capability of separate examination of the component parts as well as specialized investigation when directed. The need for increase in Inspection activities became apparent during the period and better facilities were provided. However, a more thorough inspection procedure is still needed, aimed principally at basic security practices outside of Washington and as an assistance to Senior Representatives and Chiefs of Missions abroad. I&SO has provided a number of trained security officers to our field missions in 1951 and many more are planned. It is next important to follow up on these persons through correspondence and by visits in order to help them to coordinate their problems and to provide necessary assistance and more uniform policy guidance. Other inspection functions are most varied ranging from physical and personnel security surveys of contractors' plants, security surveys of covert and overt U. S. installations, major administrative investigations ordered by the DCI or Deputy Directors.

The inspection function is not yet completely carried out and a more complete program is required.

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Counter-intelligence Research and Action:

The means and measures necessary for counter-intelligence have kept pace with the growth of the Agency. The development of our own investigative files and reference indices containing many thousands of names cross-indexed for counter-intelligence purposes has been of great assistance not only in screening but in study of possible counter-intelligence problems. The use of our investigative agents on counter-intelligence work is curtailed due to the tremendous applicant case load and will only be remedied when our investigative capabilities are increased to adequate size as planned. Direct and highly profitable counter-intelligence liaison has been set up with other major investigative agencies and with certain civil authorities. Research and study of our files and of the various "patterns" involved in possible counter-intelligence problems has been given more emphasis. No major penetrations of the Agency have been discovered during this period, although a number of possible penetrations have been "screened" out before entrance on duty. On the other hand, no real evidence of an important penetration has been found by us or been reported by the FBI. However, the I&SO goes on the assumption that there must be some penetration and can not be complacent on this score. Nevertheless, the Agency has not had one case of an alleged subversive brought before the Congress or before the public by allegations in the Press.

Operational Support:

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Despite the phenomenal growth of the Agency during this period, it has been possible to maintain a sound Security Program which probably has the highest standards in government. There are weaknesses we know of, and improvements we must make. There is much credit due to our leaders and to the bulk of our employees. Basically security rests with them and it is not an easy virtue. This office is proud of and grateful for the support it has received. We are a young agency and much better than we realize. The boy has gone through adolescence and has become a pretty sound guy who has a great future if he continues to keep his eye on that ball.

SHEFFIELD EDWARDS

Colonel, CSC

Assistant Deputy/Inspection & Security

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